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I. INTRODUCTION
Of the myriad crises facing the world, none has more potential
for global damage and long-term impacts as climate change. From
coastal land loss in the Gulf of Mexico, to rising waters in the
Netherlands, to drowning Pacific Islands, the impacts of a warming
climate and rising seas are obvious. Although skeptics remain,
most nations recognize the problems posed by a warming world,
and many are actively working to address them. Mitigation
Copyright 2012, by ANN POWERS.
∗ Ann Powers is an Associate Professor of Law at Pace Law School’s
Center for Environmental Legal Studies. She thanks Nicholas Curtiss-Rowlands
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measures aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions are being
pursued, and efforts to adapt to changing conditions are debated
and sometimes implemented. Few countries are more concerned
with making progress in this regard than countries with low-lying
coastal regions and island nations, which are directly threatened by
a warming climate and concomitant rise in sea levels. Many are
developing countries and small island developing states (SIDS)
where tourism and fishing are usually key industries; climate
change, and sea-level rise in particular, may gravely impact such
areas. Unfortunately, these states also often have the least capacity,
financing, or support for mitigation and adaptation initiatives.
Though the extent of sea-level rise and other consequences of
climate change are uncertain, global sea level rose 16 centimeters
(cm) in the twentieth century, and the rate of rise is rapidly
accelerating.1 In its 2007 report, the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) predicted sea levels to rise between 18 cm
to 59 cm in the next century.2 For many states, infrastructure and
settlements built along coasts will become uninhabitable or even
vanish, and a few nations face the real possibility of disappearance
beyond the next century mark.3 Developing countries are expected
to suffer the earliest and to the greatest degree because of their
geographical location, low incomes, weak institutional capacities,
and greater reliance on climate-sensitive sectors like agriculture.4
1. John A. Church & Neil J. White, A 20th Century Acceleration in Global
Sea-Level Rise, 33 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 1, 2 (2006), available at http://
naturescapebroward.com/NaturalResources/ClimateChange/Documents/GRL_Ch
urch_White_2006_024826.pdf.
2. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 45 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf.
3. Susmita Dasgupta, Benoit Laplante, Craig Meisner, David Wheeler &
Jianping Yan, The Impact of Sea Level Rise on Developing Countries: A
Comparative Analysis, WORLD BANK, 1, 9–10 (Feb. 2007), http://www-wds.
worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2007/02/09/00001
6406_20070209161430/Rendered/PDF/wps4136.pdf. A one-meter sea-level rise
would affect approximately 0.3% of the territory of developing countries and
approximately 56 million people, or 1.28% of the world population. Eighty-nine
million people, or 2.03% of the population, would be impacted by a two-meter
sea-level rise. Thus, these small increases in sea-level rise affect a significant
population. Such changes not only have social and economic impacts, but also
possibly security implications. See G.A. Res. 63/281, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/281
(2009); U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., 85th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.85 (June
3, 2009); Press Release, General Assembly, Expressing Deep Concern, Invites
Major United Nations Organs to Intensify Efforts in Addressing Security
Implications of Climate Change, U.N. Press Release GA/10830 (June 3, 2009).
4. William Burns, Potential Implications of Climate Change for the
Coastal Resources of Pacific Island Developing Countries and Potential Legal
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The threat to these areas from sea-level rise is often compounded
by other changing climate patterns, leading to coastal wetlands
losses, groundwater salinization, loss of arable land, and increased
storm activity. For the SIDS, even slight sea-level rise could be
dangerous to the health of their economies, people, and
environments. SIDS especially have a variety of factors that
aggravate their inability to cope with the effects of rising sea levels
and climate change. These factors include their limited physical
size and natural resources; their often fragile economies and social
and institutional structures; and their susceptibility to natural
hazards, such as tsunamis and storms.5
Among other concerns for low-lying coastal states is the
question of changing territorial boundaries caused by sea-level rise
and the possible impact this will have on the cultures and
economies of affected coastal nations. The United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS or the Convention)6
is the touchstone for establishing states’ rights to maritime zones,
from inland waters to the deep ocean. Most of the world’s nations
are parties to the Convention, and it is binding upon them. In
addition, most of its provisions are regarded as customary
international law and are therefore binding on all states, even
nonparties. The maritime zones provided in the Convention extend
specific distances from the coastal baseline established by each
state, usually at mean low water marks, and encompass varying
rights and duties. The economies of SIDS are often heavily
dependent upon coastal resources. Thus, delimiting a country’s
various maritime boundaries, especially the territorial sea and
exclusive economic zone, is particularly important.
Under UNCLOS, a state’s territorial sea extends 12 nautical
miles from the coastal baseline and is, as the name suggests,
essentially sovereign territory.7 Beyond the territorial sea, an
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extends an additional 188 nautical

and Policy Responses, 8 HARV. ASIA–PAC. REV. 4, 7 (2006), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=930449.
5. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATIONS AND VULNERABILITY 692–93 (M.L. Parry et al.
eds., 2007) [hereinafter IPCC CHAPTER 16], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/
pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter16.pdf.
6. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS], available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/
Publication/UNTS/Volume%201833/volume-1833-A-31363-English.pdf.
7. Id. art. 3, at 400. Ships of other states, however, enjoy the right of
innocent passage. Id. art. 17, at 404.
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miles, ending 200 nautical miles from the baseline.8 Within its
EEZ, a state may “explor[e,] exploit[], conserv[e,] and manag[e]
the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters
superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil.”9 The
coastal state also has jurisdiction over its continental shelf
“throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the
outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200
nautical miles from the baselines.”10 A state may claim an
extended continental shelf if it can demonstrate actual extension
beyond 200 miles. Like the EEZ, states may exploit the natural
resources of the continental shelf.11 Finally, the high seas are areas
beyond national jurisdiction, constituting “all parts of the sea that
are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial
sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters
of an archipelagic State.”12 With sea-level rise, the coastal
baselines from which maritime zones are measured will change.
While the change might be slight in most cases, for some states it
could be quite consequential.
This Article first examines the physical, cultural, and economic
backgrounds of four vulnerable states—Tuvalu, Seychelles,
Maldives, and Bangladesh—and discusses the extent to which each
might be affected by sea-level rise. It then considers, in turn, the
legal implications of the current rules on maritime delimitation
under UNCLOS for the states, along with their efforts to adapt to
sea-level rise.
II. FOUR VULNERABLE STATES
The four countries included in this review represent a crosssection of geographic areas, natural resources, and economic
situations. The potential problems they face from sea-level rise and
climate change are also representative of many coastal countries
and small island states.

8. Id. art. 57, at 419. The Convention also provides for a contiguous zone
beyond the territorial sea, extending from 12 to 24 miles from the baseline, in
which the coastal state has limited authority over customs, fiscal, immigration,
and sanitary matters. Id. art. 33, at 409.
9. Id. art. 56, at 418. Conservation of the living resources includes determining
allowable catches of those resources within the EEZ. Id. art. 61(1), at 420.
10. Id. art. 76, at 428. The continental shelf “comprises the sea-bed and
subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea.” Id.
11. Id. art. 77(1), at 429.
12. Id. art. 86, at 432.
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A. Tuvalu
Tuvalu is a Pacific archipelago of nine coral islands with a total
land area of 26.5 square kilometers.13 It is considered by the U.N.
to be one of the world’s least developed countries; in 2010 its per
capita GDP was approximately $3,400, and the state’s aggregate
GDP was $36 million.14 Tuvalu is a party to UNCLOS;15 however,
it lacks both the human and financial capacity to formally delineate
its EEZ pursuant to UNCLOS.16 This results in significant
uncertainty about the size of its EEZ, with estimates ranging from
900,000 to 1.3 million square kilometers.17 “Tuvalu is one of the
most vulnerable countries in the world to sea-level rise,” with an
average elevation of only one meter above sea level.18 Indeed,
Tuvalu’s highest elevation is only 5 meters and at its widest point
only 200 meters.19 Increased storm activity, sea-level rise, and
intensive land use have made Tuvalu extremely susceptible to
coastal erosion and, thus, to loss of territory.20 Coral reefs provide
Tuvalu with significant protection against coastal erosion and also
13. See generally A.J. TILLING & E. FIHAKI, TUVALU NAT’L BIODIVERSITY
STRATEGY & ACTION PLAN, FOURTH NATIONAL REPORT TO THE CONVENTION ON
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 7 (2009), available at http://www.sprep.org/att/IRC/
eCOPIES/Countries/Tuvalu/55.pdf; TE MAILE CONSULTANCY FOR THE ECON. &
SOCIAL COMM’N FOR ASIA & THE PAC., ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE BARBADOS PROGRAMME OF ACTIONS FOR SMALL ISLANDS DEVELOPING
STATES, AND THE MAURITIUS STRATEGY FOR THE FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE BPOA 7 (2010) [hereinafter TE MAILE], available at http://www.sidsnet.org/
msi_5/docs/nars/Pacific/Tuvalu-MSI-NAR2010.pdf; Joeli Veitayaki, Pio Manoa
& Alan Resture, Addressing Climate Change and Sea Level Rise in the Pacific
Islands, 47 KAGOSHIMA U. RES. CENTER FOR PAC. ISLANDS OCCASIONAL PAPERS
1, 16 (2007), available at http://www.spc.int/lrd/index.php?option=com_docman
&task=doc_download&gid=1145&Itemid=48; MINISTRY OF NATURAL RES.,
ENV’T, AGRIC., & LANDS, DEP’T OF ENV’T, TUVALU’S NATIONAL ADAPTATION
PROGRAMME OF ACTION 32 (2007) [hereinafter TUVALU MINISTRY], available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/tuv01.pdf.
14. Tuvalu (03/01/11), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.state.
gov/outofdate/bgn/tuvalu/176715.htm; Least Developed Countries: About LDCs,
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE LEAST
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, LANDLOCKED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE SMALL
ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES (UN-OHRLLS), http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/25/
(last visited Oct. 9, 2012). See also Cent. Intelligence Agency, Tuvalu, THE
WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
geos/tv.html (last updated Sept. 11, 2012).
15. TE MAILE, supra note 13, at 30.
16. Id. at 8.
17. TILLING & FIHAKI, supra note 13, at 8; Veitayaki, supra note 13, at 16.
18. TILLING & FIHAKI, supra note 13, at 7–8; TE MAILE, supra note 13, at 7.
19. TILLING & FIHAKI, supra note 13, at 7–8; TUVALU MINISTRY, supra
note 13, at 32.
20. TUVALU MINISTRY, supra note 13, at 30–31.
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help to build the islands.21 However, because Tuvalu’s average
temperatures are within the upper limits for most coral species,
further temperature increases are likely to result in significant coral
mortality.22 Therefore, the effects of sea-level rise, coastal erosion,
and coral damage will likely result in significant land loss for
Tuvalu, potentially shrinking its EEZ.
Fishing is a way of life in Tuvalu. Of all Tuvaluan households,
67% of them were engaged in fishing activities in 2002,23
contributing $1.6 million, or 8%, of Tuvalu’s GDP.24 Fishing
provides the primary source of protein for the Tuvaluans who
consume approximately 100 kilograms of fish per person each year.25
Foreign fleets also fish Tuvaluan waters, bringing welcome
revenue to the state. The foreign catch in 2007 was about 35,551
tons of fish, valued at $40,924,370,26 and the sale of foreign fishing
licenses alone resulted in approximately $355 of Tuvalu’s per capita
income.27 Even though Tuvalu attains significant revenue from the
sale of offshore fishing licenses, its extensive EEZ and severe lack
of enforcement capacity have resulted in widespread illegal and
unreported fishing28 and have made it difficult to manage the ten
conservation areas it established on eight of its islands.29
B. Seychelles
Seychelles is an archipelago in the Indian Ocean consisting of
approximately 115 islands and an aggregate land area of 455
square kilometers30 and an EEZ of approximately 1.3 million
21. Id. at 30.
22. Id. at 29.
23. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, NATIONAL FISHERY
SECTOR OVERVIEW: TUVALU 10 (2010) [hereinafter FAO TUVALU], available at
ftp://ftp.fao.org/FI/DOCUMENT/fcp/en/FI_CP_TV.pdf.
24. Id. at 1.
25. Veitayaki, supra note 13, at 8; TILLING & FIHAKI, supra note 13, at 9;
Fishery Country Profile: Tuvalu, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS
(Apr. 2002), http://www.fao.org/fi/oldsite/FCP/en/TUV/profile.htm.
26. FAO TUVALU, supra note 23, at 2.
27. ROBERT GILLETT, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
MARINE FISHERY RESOURCES OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS 44 (2010), available at
http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/i1452e/i1452e00.pdf.
28. See TILLING & FIHAKI, supra note 13, at 9–10.
29. TILLING & FIHAKI, supra note 13, at 10, 15.
30. MINISTRY OF ENV’T & TRANSP., REPUBLIC OF SEYCHELLES, INITIAL
NATIONAL COMMUNICATION UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (2000) [hereinafter SEYCHELLES MINISTRY],
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/seync1.pdf; Seychelles, MANGROVES
FOR THE FUTURE, http://www.mangrovesforthefuture.org/countries/members/
seychelles/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2012) [hereinafter SEYCHELLES MANGROVES];
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square kilometers.31 Due to its low-lying elevation and significant
coastal development, the country is very susceptible to land loss as
a result of sea-level rise. It is estimated that a one-meter increase in
sea levels would submerge many of Seychelles’ islands, resulting
in a loss of 70% of its land area.32 This is especially alarming
because approximately 85% of the Seychelles’ development occurs
along its coasts.33 Seychelles’ President captured the urgency of
the threat of rising waters in his statement to the 2007 Global
Island Partnership meeting in Rome; he noted that much of the
country’s coastlines have suffered losses in recent years, with some
areas losing over 50 meters of coastal plateau.34
Seychelles’ coral and mangrove ecosystems have been put at
significant risk by the effects of climate change and development.
These ecosystems provide Seychelles with natural protections
against sea-level rise, offering strong protection against erosion and
serving as both a breeding ground and a habitat for fish.35 Elevated
sea temperatures near Seychelles have recently caused up to 95%
mortality in some coral reefs, and further warming is likely to cause
mass coral bleaching.36 Dense coastal development will lead to the
loss of mangrove forests because it impedes the mangrove forests’
ability to naturally retreat shoreward as the sea level rises.37
Seychelles is home to over a thousand endemic flora and fauna,
and the government has made significant commitments to
protecting its unique biodiversity and ecosystems, setting aside
46% of its land and an additional 226 square kilometers of ocean
as national parks and reserves.38 The Vallée de Mai Nature
MICHÈLE P. MARTIN, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT REPORT: REPUBLIC OF SEYCHELLES
(2004–2009) 4-5 (2010), available at http://www.sidsnet.org/msi_5/docs/nars/
AIMS/Seychelles-MSI-NAR2010.pdf. See also Cent. Intelligence Agency,
Seychelles, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/se.html (last updated Sept. 24, 2012); Seychelles (01/20/12),
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 1, 2012), http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/seychelles/
194938.htm.
31. SEYCHELLES MANGROVES, supra note 30; MARTIN, supra note 30, at 5.
32. United Nations Env’t Programme, Coastal Erosion and Climate Change
in the Western Indian Ocean Islands, AFRICA ENV’T OUTLOOK, http://www.
unep.org/dewa/Africa/publications/aeo-1/110.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2012).
33. SEYCHELLES MINISTRY, supra note 30, at 9.
34. Sea Level Rise Foundation, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF SEYCHELLES, http://www.statehouse.gov.sc/index.php?option=com_content
&view=article&id=85&Itemid=75 (last visited Sept. 30, 2012).
35. Id.; SEYCHELLES MINISTRY, supra note 30, at 82.
36. SEYCHELLES MINISTRY, supra note 30, at 97; Sea Level Rise Foundation,
supra note 34.
37. SEYCHELLES MINISTRY, supra note 30, at 82.
38. Id. at 2.

158

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

Reserve has been designated as a UNESCO world heritage site,39
and comprehensive sea turtle protection has been implemented
through a 1994 law.40 Seychelles has engaged local stakeholders in
these conservation efforts through stakeholder reports on
conservation, habitat management, and even rehabilitation
efforts.41 To address shortcomings in monitoring capacity,
Seychelles has established a “Greenline,” which allows citizens to
report illegal activity to the applicable conservation agency.42
Seychelles’ economy is primarily driven by tourism and fishing,
which contribute over 40% of its GNP.43 In 1996, tourism brought
in over $100 million to the Seychelles, about 17% of its GNP, and
employed 18% of its workforce.44 Fishing provides approximately
4% of the Seychelles GDP, and in 1996, licensing fees alone
brought in more than $7 million.45 The artisanal fishing industry
produces about 4,500 tons of fish for domestic consumption and
approximately 370 tons, worth over $2 million, in exports.46 As with
Tuvalu, fishing is a way of life in the Seychelles and is one of the
most important local sources of protein.47
C. Maldives
Maldives is an archipelago of coral atolls consisting of 1,192
islands in the Indian Ocean with a land area of about 300 square

39. Id. at 2.
40. See generally Jeanne A. Mortimer, John Collie & Charles Mbindo, The
Status of Sea Turtle Conservation in the Republic of Seychelles, 165 UNEP
REGIONAL SEAS REP. & STUD. 103 (1996), available at http://college.holycross.
edu/faculty/kprestwi/chelonia/pubs/4_symposium/Mortimer_Collie_Mbindo.pdf.
41. MARINE CONSERVATION SOC’Y SEYCHELLES, STAKEHOLDERS’ STRATEGY
& ACTION PLAN FOR TURTLE CONSERVATION IN SEYCHELLES 4, 6 (2004) (on file
with the Louisiana Law Review).
42. Greenline Helps Public Protect Environment, SEYCHELLES NATION,
Nov. 4, 2011, http://www.nation.sc/index.php?art=23093.
43. SEYCHELLES MANGROVES, supra note 30.
44. SEYCHELLES MINISTRY, supra note 30, at 26.
45. Ian Kawaley, Implications of the Exclusive Economic Zone and EEZ
Management for Seychelles, a Small Midocean Commonwealth Territory, 29
OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 225, 235 (1998); SEYCHELLES MINISTRY, supra note
31, at 96.
46. SEYCHELLES MINISTRY, supra note 30, at 96. In fact in 2008, the Seychelles
supplied about 2.4% of the world’s tuna production. See MAKATO PETER MIYAKE,
PATRICE GUILLOTREAU, CHIN-HWA SUN & GAKUSHI ISHIMURA, FOOD & AGRIC.
ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TUNA INDUSTRY:
STOCKS, FISHERIES, MANAGEMENT, PROCESSING, TRADE AND MARKETS 96 (2010),
available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/i1705e/i1705e.pdf.
47. Kawaley, supra note 45, at 234.
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kilometers,48 sustained through continuous coral formation.49 Its
EEZ covers more than 859,000 square kilometers.50 Maldives has
made a firm commitment to address the effects of climate change
and was the first country to sign the Kyoto Protocol, calling for
greenhouse gas reductions.51 It has played an active role in calling
attention to the plight of SIDS and has been instrumental in the
Alliance of Small Island States’ (AOSIS) push for climate change
action.
With over 80% of its land area less than one meter above sea
level and its highest elevation no more than three meters, Maldives
is another of the nations most vulnerable to sea-level rise.52 Due to
significant beach erosion and its low-lying elevation, some studies
have estimated that with a one-meter rise in sea level, Maldives may
cease to exist.53 Even if the physical impact is not that severe, other
studies have predicted that sea-level rise could cause Maldives’
GDP to drop by almost 40% due to its impact on fishing and
tourism.54
Fishing has been a way of life and a main occupation in
Maldives for centuries.55 It plays a significant role in the economy
of the Maldives and accounts for about 6% of the national GDP.56
The Maldives’ fishing sector employs about 11% of the workforce
and accounts for about 98% of its physical exports.57 About 80% of
the Maldives’ fishery sector consists of skipjack and yellowfin tuna
fishing.58 Tuna provides the primary source of protein in the
48. MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, HOUS. & ENV’T, REPUBLIC OF MALDIVES,
FIRST NATIONAL COMMUNICATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALDIVES TO THE
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (2001)
[hereinafter MALDIVES MINISTRY], available at http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/natc/maldnc1.pdf. See also Cent. Intelligence Agency, Maldives, THE
WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
geos/mv.html (last updated Sept. 20, 2012); Background Note: Maldives, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/ 5476.htm.
49. MALDIVES MINISTRY, supra note 48, at 16.
50. Id. at 12.
51. Id. at 35.
52. Id. at 5, 16.
53. Id. at 5.
54. IPCC CHAPTER 16, supra note 5, at 709.
55. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, NATIONAL FISHERY
SECTOR OVERVIEW: MALDIVES 5 (2009) [hereinafter FAO MALDIVES],
available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/FI/DOCUMENT/fcp/en/FI_CP_MV.pdf. Maldivian
fishermen traditionally build their own boats, and income is distributed equally
among the crew, while an extra share is allocated to the master fisherman, the
ship owner, and for vessel maintenance. Id.
56. Id. at 2.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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Maldives, and the per capita consumption is about 137 kilograms
per year.59
Although enforcement resources are slim, foreign fleets fishing
within the Maldives’ EEZ are monitored with a vessel monitoring
system, and there have been several cases involving the coast
guard’s apprehension of unlicensed vessels.60 To further enforce
their licensing regime, the Maldives has contracted with GeoEye to
build a new vessel monitoring system that will track vessels with
GPS signals and help keep track of fish-catch reports.61
Tourism makes up another sizable portion of the Maldives’ GDP:
33%.62 Climate change is expected to lead to significant decreases in
tourism income for the state due to factors such as loss of beaches and
degradation of dive sites resulting from coral bleaching.63
D. Bangladesh
Bangladesh is a low-lying coastal Asian state located along the
Bay of Bengal with a land area of about 144,054 square kilometers64
and a population of approximately 131 million people.65 It is listed
by the UN as one of the world’s least developed countries with a per
capita GDP of only $351.66 Sadly, 36% of its population lives on a
dollar per day or less.67
59. FIN. & PRIVATE SECTOR DEV. UNIT, S. ASIA REGION, THE WORLD
BANK, THE MALDIVES: SUSTAINING GROWTH & IMPROVING THE INVESTMENT
CLIMATE 65–66 (2006), available at http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pub/
2006/ICA_MaldivesREPORT.pdf.
60. FAO MALDIVES, supra note 55, at 5.
61. GeoEye Wins Contract to Build Vessel Monitoring System for Republic of
Maldives, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/geoeye-wins-contract-to-build-vessel-monitoring-system-for-republic-ofmaldives-113023184.html.
62. MALDIVES MINISTRY, supra note 48, at 30.
63. Id. at 65–66.
64. INT’L UNION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURE & NATURAL RES.,
MARINE PROTECTED AREA NEEDS IN THE SOUTH ASIAN SEAS REGION VOL. 1:
BANGLADESH 1 (John C. Pernetta ed., 1993) [hereinafter IUCN], available at
http://data. iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/MRN-007_1.pdf.
65. MINISTRY OF ENV’T & FOREST GOV’T OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
BANGLADESH, NATIONAL ADAPTATION PROGRAMME OF ACTION 2 (2005)
[hereinafter BANGLADESH MINISTRY], available at http://www.moef.gov.bd/
bangladesh%20napa%20unfccc%20version.pdf.
66. Id. at 2. See generally OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE
LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, LANDLOCKED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES &
SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES, UNITED NATIONS, THE LEAST DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES: THINGS TO KNOW, THINGS TO DO (2012), available at http://www.
unohrlls.org/UserFiles/File/LATEST%20IPoA.pdf.
67. BANGLADESH MINISTRY, supra note 65, at 3. See also Cent. Intelligence
Agency, Bangladesh, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/

2012]

SEA-LEVEL RISE IN VULNERABLE STATES

161

Because about 80% of Bangladesh consists of coastal flood
plains, sea-level rise could have potentially devastating
consequences.68 Approximately 35.1 million people live in the
coastal zone, over half of whom are considered “absolute poor.”69
The World Bank estimates that there will be a one-meter rise in sea
level by 2100, which will cause Bangladesh to lose over 17% of its
territory.70
Although Bangladesh has only recently opened its deep water
areas in the Bay of Bengal to energy exploration, there may be vast
natural gas fields, as there are in surrounding areas controlled by
India and Myanmar.71 The average estimate of undiscovered
offshore natural gas controlled by Bangladesh is 18.1 trillion cubic
feet,72 worth over $52 billion.73 For a country as poor as
Bangladesh, royalties from these potential deposits could have a
tremendous impact.
Bangladesh contains about 60% of the Sundarbans, an
extensive mangrove forest of approximately 407,313 hectares.74
The Sundarbans is a UNESCO World Heritage site and the largest
remaining tract of habitat for the last few hundred wild Bengal

publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bg.html (last updated Sept. 13, 2012);
Background Note: Bangladesh, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 6, 2012),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3452.htm.
68. BANGLADESH MINISTRY, supra note 65, at 1. See also Mason Inman,
Where Warming Hits Hard, 3 NATURE REPORTS CLIMATE CHANGE 18, 19
(2009), available at http://www.nature.com/climate/2009/0902/pdf/climate.2009
.3.pdf.
69. Golam Mahabub Sarwar & Mamunul H. Khan, Sea Level Rise: A Threat
to the Coast of Bangladesh, 38 INTERNATIONALES ASIENFORUM 375, 380 (2007),
available at http://www.undp.org.bd/library/policypapers/Asienforum_Sarwar_
Khan.pdf.
70. Id. at 376–78.
71. Badrul Imam, Op-Ed, Offshore: The New Gas Frontier of Bangladesh?,
DAILY STAR (Oct. 16, 2009), http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/newsdetails.php?nid=109865.
72. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY WORLD ENERGY ASSESSMENT TEAM,
BANGLADESH: ASSESSMENT RESULTS SUMMARY—ALLOCATED RESOURCES
(2000), available at http://energy.cr.usgs.gov/WEcont/regions/reg8/r8bang.pdf.
73. This value assumes a price of $2.88 per million BTUs—the August 22,
2012 average price on the New York Mercantile Exchange. See United Nations
Conference on Trade & Dev., Info-Comm: Natural Gas—Quality, http://www.
unctad.org/infocomm/anglais/gas/quality.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2012); U.S.
Energy Info. Admin., Natural Gas: Weekly Update, http://www.eia.doe.gov/
oog/info/ngw/ngupdate.asp (last visited Sept. 30, 2012).
74. IUCN, supra note 64, at 5. An aerial photo of coastal Bangladesh’s
Sundarbans mangroves bears a striking resemblance to coastal Louisiana with its
many fingers of water and land.
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tigers.75 According to the IPCC, a one-meter increase in sea level
will likely cause the demise of this fragile ecosystem.76 The
Sundarbans serves as protection against coastal erosion, so its loss
would likely lead to greater land loss.77
As a result of climate change and rising sea levels, many
vulnerable coastal and island nations may suffer severe physical,
economic, and cultural impacts. Those impacts may be exacerbated
by the loss of territory due to shifting maritime boundaries.
III. SHIFTING MARITIME ZONES
A. The Effect of UNCLOS
With sea-level rise, the baselines from which most maritime
zones are measured will change. As a consequence, the outer
boundary of the zone may also change, retreating landward. While
the change might be slight in most cases, in others it could be quite
consequential, as, for example, if a baseline point such as an
exposed rock disappears.78 Excepted from this general rule are the
boundaries of a state’s continental shelf because the coastal state
must “deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations
charts and relevant information, including geodetic data,
permanently describing the outer limits of its continental shelf.”79
UNCLOS also appears to fix the baselines of deltas and areas where
natural conditions cause the coastline to be highly unstable. Article 7
of UNCLOS provides that when “a coastline is highly unstable . . .
notwithstanding subsequent regression of the low-water line, the
straight baselines shall remain effective until changed by the coastal
State in accordance with this Convention.”80
75. BANGLADESH MINISTRY, supra note 65, at 5.
76. Sarwar & Khan, supra note 69, at 384.
77. Id. at 385.
78. Charles Di Leva & Sachiko Morita, Maritime Rights of Coastal States
and Climate Change: Should States Adapt to Submerged Boundaries?, WORLD
BANK LAW & DEV. WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 5, 15–16 (July 2008),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTICE/Resources/L&D_number
5.pdf. See also, e.g., 3 AARON L. SHALOWITZ & MICHAEL W. REED, SHORE AND
SEA BOUNDARIES 185 (2000), available at http://www.nauticalcharts.noaa.gov/
hsd/docs/CSE_library_shalowitz_Part_two.pdf.
79. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 76(9), at 429.
80. UNCLOS supra note 6, art. 7(2), at 401; Di Leva & Morita, supra note
78, at 18. Some states have made substantial efforts to protect their existing
maritime boundaries and their rights. For instance, in 2007 Canada announced it
would spend CA$3.1 billion for the purchase of new patrol ships which will be
used to increase the Canadian presence in the Arctic to which it has exploration
rights, with an additional expenditure of CA$4.3 billion for their maintenance over
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B. Judicial Decisions Regarding Boundaries
In some nations, such as the United States, maritime
boundaries are treated as ambulatory, and thus, when sea level
rises over time, the boundaries will change. In United States. v.
Alaska, the Supreme Court recognized the possibility of
ambulatory boundaries, but courts in other nations may rule
differently.81 Although international tribunals like the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) have yet to decide cases involving sea-level
rise and claims of ambulatory baselines, the ICJ has given several
principles to guide the establishment of maritime boundaries. In
Cameroon v. Nigeria, the ICJ relied upon an equidistance
principle, first drawing an equidistant line based on the countries’
geography, and then evaluating other factors to determine whether
the line should be shifted to achieve an equitable result.82 Some of
the relevant circumstances recognized by the ICJ and other
international tribunals include: the general configuration of the
coasts of the parties; general geomorphological, geological, and
geographical factors; the incidence of natural resources (usually oil
and natural gas) in the disputed area and the principle of equitable
access to these resources; defense and security interests of the
states that are party to the dispute; and consistency with the general
direction of the land boundary.83
The effects of shifting baselines could lead to litigation in the
ICJ and other tribunals as delineation of maritime boundaries is
difficult and disputes contentious. For instance, disputes between
Bangladesh and its neighbors, Myanmar and India, over oil and gas
deposits in the Bay of Bengal led to confrontations between
Bangladeshi and Myanmar warships. In 2009, Bangladesh
submitted separate boundary disputes in the Bay of Bengal against
Myanmar and India to UNCLOS arbitration.84 The controversy
the 25-year life span of the ships. Canwest News Service, Canada to Add Arctic
Patrol Vessels, Deep-Water Port, CANADA.COM (July 9, 2007), http://www.
canada.com/story_print.html?id=603a03fb-9ab0-463a-8214-bfd1c5c121ba.
81. United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 31 (1997).
82. Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria
(Cameroon v. Nigeria: Eq. Guinea Intervening), 2002 I.C.J. 303, ¶ 288 (Oct. 10).
83. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 217–18
(7th ed. 2008).
84. Michael A. Becker & Ernesto J. Sanchez, International Law of the Sea,
44 INT’L LAWYER 519, 524–26 (2010). See also Letter from Dipu Moni,
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Government of the People’s Republic of
Bangladesh, to José Luis Jesus, President, Int’l Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(Dec. 13, 2009), available at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/
cases/case_no_16/Notification_Bangladesh_14.12.09.pdf; Delimitation of the
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between Bangladesh and Myanmar was subsequently submitted to
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, which
promulgated a boundary for the continental shelves of Bangladesh
and Myanmar.85 While litigation is one route that states may take
to delimit maritime boundaries, there are less confrontational
alternatives, such as dispute resolution under UNCLOS. Whatever
the forum chosen, clearly delineated boundaries should lessen
disputes.
C. The Impact of Shifting Boundaries on Fisheries
If a coastal state’s baseline, and concomitantly its maritime
zones, were to shift significantly landward, the change could have
adverse consequences for the state’s efforts to manage coastal
waters and exploit its resources. If the shift were substantial
enough, large segments of waters formerly under the jurisdiction of
the state might be beyond its EEZ and, thus, form part of the high
seas, open to all. These areas beyond national jurisdiction may be
subject to some provisions of UNCLOS86 or other international
agreements, but protections are limited.
Pursuant to UNCLOS articles 118 and 119(2), in dealing with
the high seas, states must make scientific information, catch-andfishing-effort statistics, and any additional data relevant to the
conservation of fish stocks available to international
organizations.87 To implement these provisions, states are required
to keep a “national record of fishing vessels authorized to fish on
the high seas and provision of access to information contained in

Maritime Boundary Between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal
(Bangl./Myan.), Case No. 16, Order of Jan. 28, 2010, ITLOS Rep. 2008–2010,
24, available at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_
16/Ord.2010-1.28.01.2010.E.pdf.
85. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Bangladesh and
Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangl./Myan.), Case No. 16, Judgment of Mar.
14, 2012, http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_16/1-C16
_Judgment_14_02_2012.pdf. See also Moin Ghani, Op-Ed, A ‘Great Win’ for
Bangladesh, DAILY STAR (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.thedailystar.net/new
Design/news-details.php?nid=227828. Boundary conflicts such as this create
international friction and pose the potential for armed hostilities. Additional
examples of such frictions can be found in the current disputes between China and
its neighbors over island territories. See Martin Fackler, Dispute over Islands
Reflects Japanese Fear of China’s Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2012, http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/08/22/world/asia/dispute-over-islands-reflect-japanese-fear-ofchinas-rise.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all.
86. UNCLOS, supra note 6, arts. 116–120, at 441–42.
87. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 118, 119(2), at 441, 442.
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that record on requires by directly interested states.”88 If enforced,
these articles can help ensure not only that relevant information is
gathered and transmitted, but also that transparency in the process
is maintained, which is a precursor to effective international
conservation efforts. Unfortunately, it can be difficult for states to
track and monitor all of their flagged fishing vessels, even in their
own waters, and states may have little incentive to ensure that their
vessels do not misreport their catches, especially in distant waters.
Additionally, transparency is required only as to other states, and
there are no requirements to release this information to the public,
which limits oversight.89
Even though UNCLOS provides a framework for establishing
sustainable yields for high seas fisheries, issues arise when it
comes to actually enforcing allowable catches and promoting
conservation efforts. Article 119(1) of UNCLOS requires that
states determine allowable catches based on the best scientific
evidence to maintain “populations of harvested species at levels
which can produce the maximum sustainable yield as qualified by
relevant environmental and economic factors.”90 These catch
requirements are often difficult to enforce, and as noted, states
have little incentive to police distant high seas.
A well-known example of the problem of overfishing in
international waters is the Chilean Sea Bass, or Patagonian
Toothfish. Currently described as “seriously overfished,”91 the
Chilean Sea Bass is regulated by the Commission for the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, created
pursuant to Article IX of the Antarctic treaty system.92 In 2000 it
was estimated that illegal harvesting of the Chilean Sea Bass
amounted to twice the 16,000 tons that were legally harvested in

88. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United
Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks, Sept. 8, 1995, available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN/N95/274/67/PDF/N9527467.pdf?OpenElement.
89. Yen-Chiang Chang, International Legal Obligations in Relation to
Good Ocean Governance, 9 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 589, 596 (2010), available at
http://intl-chinesejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/3/589.full.pdf+html.
90. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 119(1), at 441.
91. ALICE CASCORBI, MONTEREY BAY AQUARIUM, SEAFOOD WATCH:
CHILEAN SEABASS 3 (2006), available at http://www.montereybayaquarium.org/cr/
cr_seafoodwatch/content/media/MBA_SeafoodWatch_ChileanSeabassReport.pdf.
92. About CCAMLR, CCAMLR.ORG, http://www.ccamlr.org/en/organisation/
about-ccamlr (last updated Sept. 7, 2012); Fisheries, CCAMLR.ORG, http://www.
ccamlr.org/en/fisheries/fisheries (last updated July 13, 2012).
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the Antarctic management area.93 Although a shift of boundaries
may not always result in greater threats to fisheries and other living
resources than if they were in a state’s EEZ, the possibility
remains.94
IV. WHERE IS THE FAIRNESS?
Significant fairness concerns arise in conjunction with
boundary delineations, and equity traditionally plays a role in the
delineation process. The ICJ has recognized the importance of
delineations to the livelihood and economic well-being of the
parties to a delineation dispute. We should consider, then, the
equitable issues involved when addressing the current regime of
ambulatory baselines for territorial seas and EEZs. Most of the
countries that stand to lose substantial amounts of territory if
boundaries are modified due to sea-level rise are SIDS and other
developing coastal countries. They contribute little to the global
threat and have little capacity for mitigation and adaptation, yet
they will bear a disproportionate share of the burden. This
imbalance in power and capacity to mitigate and adapt to climate
change starkly demonstrates the gulf between developed and
developing states.95
None of the four countries profiled in this Article has any
substantial capacity to mitigate the effects of climate change, as
they each contribute such a small percentage of global greenhouse
gas emissions. In 1994, Tuvalu emitted .61 tons of carbon dioxide
(CO2) per capita, compared to 22.2 tons in the United States.96
93. Fact Sheet: Chilean Sea Bass Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/trade/chile.pdf.
94. An additional example of overexploitation of a fish stock in international
waters was the Alaskan Pollock in the Bering Sea. See Allison Winter, U.S. Bans
Commercial Fishing in Warming Arctic, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2009, http://
www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/08/21/21greenwire-us-bans-commercial-fishingin-warming-arctic-33236.html; Marine Res. Serv., Review of the State of World
Fishery Resources: Marine Fisheries, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED
NATIONS (1997), http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/w4248e/w4248e22.htm.
95. ALEX G. OUDE ELFERINK, THE LAW OF MARITIME BOUNDARY
DELIMITATION: A CASE STUDY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 103 (1994)
(discussing an ICJ decision resolving the dispute between Canada and France
over the delineation of the maritime borders of Saint Pierre and Miquelon).
96. Greenhouse Gas Emissions per capita, UNITED NATIONS STATISTICS
DIV., http://unstats.un.org/unsd/environment/air_greenhouse_emissions.htm (last
updated July 2010). Tuvalu has threatened to bring suit against major polluting
countries in an attempt to force reductions. See Rebecca Elizabeth Jacobs,
Treading Deep Waters: Substantive Law Issues in Tuvalu’s Threat to Sue the
United States in the International Court of Justice, 14 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J.
103, 115 (2005).
OF COMMERCE & DEP’T OF STATE, 1,
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Because 90% of the Seychelles territory is covered with
vegetation, it sequesters about 4.4 times the amount that it emits.97
In 2007 the Maldives was responsible for just .003% of the world’s
CO2 emissions, and its per capita CO2 emissions were just under
three tons, while the world average was over five tons.98
Nevertheless, the Maldives take its own responsibilities seriously,
and to fulfill them while setting an example for the rest of the
world, it has resolved to achieve carbon neutrality within a
decade.99 In 2007, Bangladesh, with a population estimated to
exceed 150 million, the seventh largest in the world, was
responsible for less than 15% of the world’s CO2 emissions, and its
per capita emissions were only one-twentieth of the average global
per capita CO2 emissions.100 So, in spite of the Maldives’ brave
attempt to reduce its emissions, these countries have no meaningful
capacity to mitigate the effects of climate change.
Many developing states will face devastating economic
impacts as a result of climate change.101 The current regime of
ambulatory baselines threatens to deplete some of the most
valuable resources that each of these countries possesses, making it
even more difficult for these countries to build resilience to sealevel rise. Shrinking EEZs will result in lower revenues from the
fishing industries of Tuvalu, Seychelles, and Maldives. Countries
such as Bangladesh may be unable to produce sufficient revenue
from their significant nonliving resources to fund the necessary
adaptation infrastructure.
If the current ambulatory baselines regime is maintained, not
only will many of the smallest contributors to climate change lose
control over portions of their most valuable natural resources, but
many of the largest contributors to climate change will also be
positioned to reap the benefits of these resources as they become
part of the “high seas.” In 1999, a vast majority of the ships
licensed to fish in Tuvaluan waters were from the U.S. and
97. SEYCHELLES MINISTRY, supra note 30, at 4.
98. United Nations Statistics Div., Carbon dioxide emissions (CO2), metric
tons of CO2 per capita (CDIAC), MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS
INDICATORS, http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=751&crid= (last
updated July 2, 2012) [hereinafter CO2 emissions].
99. Maldives, MANGROVES FOR THE FUTURE, http://www.mangrovesforthe
future.org/countries/members/maldives/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2012).
100. CO2 emissions, supra note 98.
101. For a detailed discussion of the potential impacts on developing
countries, see THE WORLD BANK GROUP, THE COST TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
OF ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE: NEW METHODS AND ESTIMATES (2010),
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTCC/Resources/EACC-june
2010.pdf.
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Japan.102 In 2008, only six countries were licensed to fish in
Tuvaluan waters, a list that included Japan, Spain, and the U.S.103
Japan and the U.S. ranked as the second and fifth largest current
greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters in 2007 and have been the source
of a substantial portion of the world’s historical emissions of
GHGs.104 The current regime of ambulatory baselines creates a
perverse system in which countries that are responsible for most of
the world’s GHG emissions may benefit at the cost of countries
that are some of the world’s lowest emitters of GHGs.
Some of these developing states most vulnerable to climate
change have been proactive in protecting their ecological diversity,
but the loss of territory may prevent these countries from
effectively implementing their conservation efforts. Tuvalu has
engaged in conservation efforts as stated above; however, limited
enforcement resources have made effective implementation a
challenge. Shrinking EEZs will reduce revenues, and already
limited enforcement efforts will become even more scant.
Seychelles’ efforts to preserve almost 50% of its land territory and
226 square kilometers of ocean as natural areas to protect the flora
and fauna endemic to the islands will face increasing pressure as
climate costs increase and revenues shrink.105 This pressure on
protected areas will further increase as coastal settlement is forced
to retreat from rising sea levels. Therefore, it seems that countries
that have made commitments to conservation, such as Tuvalu and
Seychelles, may be stymied by loss of territory and shrinking
revenues.
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development sets
forth principles to guide nations as they pursue the goal of
sustainable development. Principle Two provides that countries
have the right to exploit their own resources, but they must do so in
a fashion that does not interfere with other countries’ rights to a
healthy environment.106 The leading GHG-emitting countries are
exploiting their resources in a manner that causes damage to the
environment and the areas beyond their national jurisdictions, in
contradiction of Principle Two. In addition, the current regime of
ambulatory baselines threatens to deprive coastal states vulnerable
to sea-level rise, like those profiled above, of some of their
102. Fishery Country Profile, supra note 25.
103. FAO TUVALU, supra note 23, at 7.
104. CO2 emissions, supra note 98.
105. SEYCHELLES MINISTRY, supra note 30, at 2.
106. United Nations Conference on Env’t & Dev., Rio de Janiero, Braz., June
3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992), available at http://www.
un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm.
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principle sources of revenue. This will impede the ability of these
countries to adapt to the effects of sea-level rise, much less pursue
national development. Further, the loss of historical fishing
grounds for many of these countries—the result of a climate
changing process caused by GHG emissions from far more
developed countries—is at odds with the concept that a right to
develop should not compromise the developmental and
environmental needs of present and future generations. For these
reasons, the current regime for boundary specification may
inequitably burden the most vulnerable states and should therefore
be reconsidered.
V. ADAPTATION TO RISING SEAS
For SIDS and other vulnerable coastal states, the diminishment
of their EEZs and other maritime zones, if sufficiently severe,
could pose potentially severe consequences for their economies,
environments, and the health and welfare of their peoples. SIDS
are especially vulnerable, so an organized process to assess the
problems and the development of adaptive strategies are especially
critical for them. Although mitigation remains a crucial strategy for
addressing climate change, and SIDS and other coastal states may
benefit from their own measures to reduce GHG emissions,
implementing adaptation measures to deal with the effects of rising
sea level is essential for them. One appropriate way to approach
adaptation is to take immediate steps to better manage their EEZs
and other maritime zones.107
A variety of challenges confront SIDS and other island states in
implementing adaptation measures. Obviously, the cost to employ
these measures could be burdensome. For instance, it has been
suggested that climate change protection initiatives would amount
to 34% of the Maldives’ GDP.108 In addition, tailoring the
adaptation measures to the specific problems and local customs of
107. In this regard, one commentator, Laurance Juda, has proposed a series
of steps. See Kawaley, supra note 45, at 226. He suggests that states should first
assess the resources and ecological systems under their jurisdiction and
determine the boundaries of their control. They should then attempt to establish
goals and priorities for adaptive measures and should attempt to regulate EEZ
activities in accordance with those goals and priorities. Finally, states must
establish appropriate institutional machinery for policy making and
administration.
108. R. Gommes, J. du Guerny, F. Nachtergaele & R. Brinkman, Potential
Impacts of Sea-Level Rise on Populations and Agriculture, FOOD & AGRIC.
ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS (Mar. 1998), http://www.fao.org/sd/eidirect/
Eire0049.htm.
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the state remains a challenge, especially if requirements imposed
by funding sources are not adapted to local conditions. Local
knowledge may not be reflected in the adaptation measures, which
devalues the contributions of local citizens who might otherwise
feel empowered to influence the manner in which their countries
respond to climate change. Community knowledge is not often
considered, and according to commentators, “Local strategies for
dealing with climate change are sometimes dismissed as
ineffective due to a lack of relevant knowledge from which to
work, even when they are actually hampered by a lack of
supportive institutions and financial resources to implement
adaptation activities.”109 Furthermore, management of these
adaptation measures is made difficult by the lack of experts
available and willing to provide aid. Within SIDS, there is a lack of
qualified scientific knowledge in the fields of marine science,
oceanography, and coastal management, as well as a lack of
appropriate equipment to ensure proper management of marine and
coastal resources.110 Therefore, external aid is necessary not only
in the form of financial resources, but also human capital.
Approaches to adaptation come in an array of forms, depending
on the state’s resources and the issues to be resolved. First,
engineering solutions may be available to address problems
associated with sea-level rise. Artificial barriers and sea walls are
frequently employed to limit beach erosion and protect against sealevel rise. These can be successful short-term adaptation options
and can be utilized to protect property at risk to the immediate
problem of sea-level ingress. However, investment in such options
is often high because such options involve expensive
hydrodynamic studies.111 For example, the cost of protecting 50 of
the 200 inhabited islands of the Maldives with artificial structures
was estimated to be over $1.5 billion in 1998;112 to protect all 200
inhabited islands would require roughly $6 billion, or more than 30
times the country’s GDP.113 Additionally, in many SIDS such as
Tuvalu, sea walls have not been adequately maintained, and in
some cases, these structures may have actually contributed to,
rather than prevented, coastal erosion.114
109. Ilan Kelman & Jennifer J. West, Climate Change and Small Island
Developing States: A Critical Review, 5 ECOLOGICAL & ENVTL. ANTHROPOLOGY,
no. 1, 2009, available at http://www.ilankelman.org/articles1/eea2009.pdf.
110. MARTIN, supra note 30, at 19.
111. SEYCHELLES MINISTRY, supra note 30, at 89.
112. MALDIVES MINISTRY, supra note 48, at 54.
113. Id. at 80.
114. Sea walls cut off the landward supply of sand during storm events,
resulting in waves that attack unprotected areas to a greater extent than they
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In addition to sea walls, other options include mechanical or
electronic tide and flood control systems, which are designed to
address specific coastal characteristics, including the location of
ports and other infrastructure. While they may sometimes present
attractive options, costs of construction and maintenance can be
prohibitive.115 Efforts to maintain and restore so-called soft
structures like beaches, dunes, and wetlands are frequently
proposed; however, they are often short term and may ultimately
succumb to rising waters.116 Bangladesh, which would like to be a
showcase for adaptation efforts, has included in its strategy ideas
borrowed from the Dutch: building a network of earthen berms and
embankments based on polders employed in the Netherlands.117
The network will be expanded, and the embankments strengthened
and built higher.118 However, SIDS are unlikely to have the
resources to implement these sorts of high-cost initiatives.
Furthermore, as the recent tsunami in Japan demonstrates, even the
most sophisticated and expensive coastal defenses may be no
match for Mother Nature.
Another adaptation option is for states to implement ecological
solutions. Preservation of natural barriers such as mangroves, coral
reefs, and sandy beaches is critically important, and the natural
ability of beaches to act as self-adjusting buffers in the face of
rising sea levels must be maintained.119 States can also create soft
structures, which absorb wave energy and engage in tree planting
for erosion control. For instance, to help reduce erosion, the
Tuvalu Council of Women, funded by the New Zealand Agency
for International Development, planted trees across the
archipelago; their efforts on Niutao, where they planted local
species, could be utilized as a “green-belt model.”120 The use of
native plants adapted to local conditions should be promoted as an
effective and ecologically beneficial means to protect coasts.121
Some states have banned certain industrial practices in an
effort to curtail ecological harm. For example, coral mining, which

would have done prior to the sea-wall construction. TUVALU MINISTRY, supra
note 13, at 32.
115. SEYCHELLES MINISTRY, supra note 30, at 89.
116. Id.
117. Mason Inman, Hot, Flat, Crowded—And Preparing for the Worst, 326
SCI. MAG. 662, 663 (2009), available at http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/
hot__flat__crowded___and_preparing_for_the_worst___mason_inman_1.pdf.
118. Id.
119. TILLING & FIHAKI, supra note 13, at 17.
120. TUVALU MINISTRY, supra note 13, at 32–33.
121. TILLING & FIHAKI, supra note 13, at 17.
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is frequently practiced in the Maldives, was restricted, and a
complete ban on coral mining was considered.122 Coastal states
with greater resources have been able to implement more
expansive initiatives such as coastal afforestration, which is
estimated to cost Bangladesh $23 million.123
There are many land-use solutions aimed at more effective
management of coastal areas. Local tourism for SIDS tends to be
highly concentrated in coastal areas where activities like fishing,
snorkeling, and water sports are popular. While tourism is
undoubtedly a significant contributor to the local economies, it has
a potentially devastating effect on the environment. For this
reason, relocating tourist activities and implementing reclamation
projects can be effective in dealing with sea-level rise and its
consequences. This solution may provide the best long-term
security for investments, but the scarcity of coastal land and its
cost presents a problem.124 Creating educational programs is also
an option. For instance, Tuvalu has adopted legislation and
programs aimed at increasing local knowledge of land use and
coastal planning.125
Finally, in some instances retreat may mean relocating the
entire population away from the home territory. Some states refuse
to consider this option due to cultural and historical ties to the
geographic area itself. Prime Minister Apisai Ielemia of Tuvalu
reflected this attitude at U.N. climate negotiations in Poznan,
Poland (2008) by asserting that “a nation has a right to exist
forever [and it] is our basic human right.”126 For most states,
retreat would be a last resort—a route to take should no other
adaptation mechanism prove successful.
Despite Tuvalu’s resistance, press reports indicate that the
Prime Minister held confidential talks with Australian officials in
October 2008 aimed at obtaining Australia’s agreement to accept
the entire Tuvaluan population if and when it is forced to
evacuate.127 In addition, Tuvalu negotiated an agreement with New
Zealand (under the Pacific Access Category and the Temporary
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Labor Scheme) for the resettlement of 75 of Tuvaluan citizens to
New Zealand each year.128
Other states have openly acknowledged their plans to relocate
to another territory. Maldives’ then-President announced in 2008
that the country would “begin to divert a portion of the country’s
billion-dollar annual tourist revenue to buying a new homeland—
as an insurance policy against climate change that threatens to turn
the 300,000 islanders into environmental refugees.”129
VI. CONCLUSION
There are no easy solutions for states vulnerable to sea-level
rise and other manifestations of climate change. For low-lying
coastal and small island states, the situation is especially acute and
is aggravated by the problem of shifting maritime boundaries.
Various proposals have been made to deal with the issue but little
progress made.130 States should make strenuous efforts both to
delimit their continental shelves and, insofar as possible, to fix
their current baselines. Because of the substantial expenses
involved in such endeavors, international programs should assist
with financial and technical support, both in establishing maritime
boundaries, as well as in developing licensing and conservation
laws and building enforcement capacity. Although sea-level rise
cannot be stopped, those countries most vulnerable to its effects
can be helped to meet its challenges.
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